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Abstract:  
2010 sees the three hundredth anniversary of the U.K.’s Statute of Anne 1710. This paper 
suggests that with the increased ability of content recipients to re-use works, there is a need 
to readdress the concerns of stakeholders, namely authors, publishers and content recipients.  
The paper sets out in detail how this should be achieved. To do so, it utilises the notion of 
creativity as the benchmark by which to balance the interests of stakeholders. This has been 
used in early eighteenth century case law in the U.K., and there are also other historical and 
theoretical justifications. The paper then proceeds to propose two new complementary 
systems. Purchase of the original work is to be required where the later work is quantitatively 
substantially similar to the original, and where a work is not quantitatively substantially 
similar, a system of compulsory licensing is to be instituted. The law will also provide a 
positive right to content recipients to make copies, and, in certain circumstances, a positive 
right to access technologically protected works. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The problem. 
 “MGM and many of the amici fault the Court of Appeal’s holding for upsetting a 
sound balance between the respective values of supporting creative pursuits through 
copyright protection and promoting innovation in new communication technologies by 
limiting the incidence of liability for copyright infringement. The more artistic 
protection is favoured, the more technological innovation may be discouraged; the 
administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing the trade-off.”1 
 
 U.K. and U.S. copyright law has become heavily focused upon attempting to maintain 
a balance between the interests of right holders of content and those of content recipients.  
The balance between right holders and content recipients has been significantly disturbed by 
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the latter’s enhanced capacity to commit large scale copyright infringements using digital 
technology.  Increasingly, content recipients can make creatively altered copies - for instance, 
ripping samples from CDs, or changing the order of scenes in a film to cause a different 
emotional effect in viewers.  Content recipients can then distribute these altered versions to 
anyone else in the world with an Internet connection.  
 The ability to distribute altered versions of original works inevitably brings the 
interests of right holders and content recipients into conflict.  Right holders may seek to use 
the negative rights provided to them by copyright law to restrict inter alia reproduction
2
 and 
in the U.K. adaptation,
3
 or in the U.S., derivation
4
 of their works.  They may also harness 
developments in technology, for example, Digital Rights Management (DRM) mechanisms 
which can be used to restrict the access to, and re-use of, content by content recipients.  The 
consequence of this is that re-users are restricted in their re-uses of copyright content.  That 
could be justifiable if it is not possible to reward right holders for such re-uses, or if right 
holders wish to prevent re-use for non-economic reasons.  However, it is suggested that a 
system can be implemented which will reward right holders, and which can provide them 
with mechanisms to restrict re-use for non-economic reasons. To this end, the paper proposes 
two complementary systems.  The first applies where a later work is quantitatively 
substantially similar to an earlier work, and requires purchase of the original work.  The 
second system applies where a later work has re-used part of an earlier work, but is not 
quantitatively substantially similar to the earlier work.  This requires payment of a royalty to 
the right holder of the earlier work. 
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B. Current copyright law: An over emphasis on the right holder 
1. The U.K. 
 Current U.K. law focuses on the damage to the right holder.  Courts do not adequately 
focus on how a finding of infringement will impact upon access to information, ideas and 
research of content recipients.  The rights provided by U.K. copyright law to right holders 
include reproduction
5
, the right to issue copies to the public,
6
 the right to rent or lend the 
work to the public,
7
 the right to perform, show or play the work in public,
8
 the right to 
communicate the work to the pubic,
9
 and adaptation.
10
  The rules concerning infringement of 
the reproduction right have been outlined by Lord Millett in the seminal Designers Guild 
case.
11
  He stated that “once the judge has found that the defendants' design incorporates 
features taken from the copyright work, the question is whether what has been taken 
constitutes all or a substantial part of the copyright work.”12  The tendency is to stress the 
effort put in to the original work.  As Lord Bingham observed in the same case, “anyone who 
by his or her own skill and labour creates an original work of whatever character shall, for a 
limited period, enjoy an exclusive right to copy that work.  No one else may for a season reap 
what the copyright owner has sown.”13  
 The emphasis on the efforts of the original author was more recently stressed in 
Sawkins v. Hyperion Records.
14
  Mummery LJ noted that in Walter v. Lane,
15
 “Lord Halsbury 
LC held that the law did not permit ‘one man to make profit and to appropriate to himself the 
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labour, skill, and capital of another’.”16  In relation to music, Mummery LJ stated that 
“performing indications, tempo and performance practice indicators, if they are the product of 
a person's effort, skill and time, bearing in mind the relatively modest level of the threshold 
for a work to qualify for protection.”17  
 The assumption in these cases is that without such protection, there is less incentive 
for an author to create.  Though the outcome of Sawkins may adversely affect future 
authors,
18
 this is not considered.  The same assumption is present within cases concerning 
infringement of the other rights that make up copyright.  For instance, case law concerning 
the performance right emphasise the importance of protection and equate loss of revenue to 
creativity.  In Jennings v. Stephens,
19
 Lord Wright stated, in relation to the requirement that 
the performance be ‘public’, that: 
.. if the performance in question is held not to be a performance 
in public, the rights of owners of dramatic copyright, copyright 
in music or copyright in lectures all over the country will be 
seriously prejudiced: their plays will be liable to lose novelty, 
and the public demand for performance will be affected: the 
public appetite will be exhausted.
20 
 
Lord Greene MR indicates that the purpose of the provision is intended to prevent someone 
“depriving the owner of the copyright of the public from whom he receives the value of the 
work of his brain and his imagination.”21  Consequently, the same issues that arise with the 
reproduction right arise with the right of performance.  The importance of access to the 
information, ideas and research of others is not being considered; instead, the emphasis of the 
courts is upon protecting existing copyrights. 
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2 Infringement actions in the U.S. 
 The “original works of authorship” covered by U.S. copyright include inter alia 
literary works, musical works including any accompanying words, dramatic works, including 
accompanying music, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural 
works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, and sound recordings.
22
  As in the U.K., 
the U.S. also has other rights additional to the reproduction right.  These are the distribution 
right, which includes the right to sell, rent, lease or lend the work, the performance right, the 
right to display the work, and a right over derivatives.
23
  There is also, in the case of sound 
recordings, a right to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission.
24
  Anyone who violates those rights is an infringer of copyright.
25
  In the U.S., 
the test for infringement of the reproduction right is whether: 
(a) [the] defendant copied from plaintiff’s copyrighted work 
and  
(b) that the copying (assuming it to be proved) went so far as to 
constitute improper appropriation.
26
 
 
As with the U.K., the U.S. test of infringement emphasises the commercial interests of an 
existing right holder, and sidelines the impact on content recipients, their potential future 
works, and their access to ideas. In order to establish infringement, it firstly has to be 
assessed whether there has been “actual copying,” which can either be established with direct 
evidence or through the test of “striking similarity.”27  Once that has been demonstrated, then, 
provided that there is copyright, it must be shown that there has been misappropriation, as 
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assessed through the eyes of the audience.
28
  The U.S. has a slightly different approach than 
the U.K. when considering the importance of the labour of the right holder.  In Feist,
29
 the 
“sweat of the brow” test for originality was overruled because “copyright rewards originality, 
not effort.”30  Nonetheless, once the requirements of originality are met, it is still the case that 
the interests of the original right holder are stressed and are considered equivalent to 
creativity.  In Castle Rock,
31
 Circuit Judge Walker emphasised that the right holder had been 
“highly selective in marketing products associated with Seinfeld, rejecting numerous 
proposals from publishers seeking approval for a variety of projects related to the show.”32 
Likewise, in Arnstein v. Porter,
33
 Circuit Judge Frank stated: 
But even if we were to disregard the improbable aspects of 
plaintiff's story, [sic] there remain parts by no means 
‘fantastic.’ On the record now before us, more than a million 
copies of one of his compositions were sold; copies of others 
were sold in smaller quantities or distributed to radio stations or 
band leaders or publishers, or the pieces were publicly 
performed.
34
 
 
In other cases, the focus on the interest of the right holder is less pronounced.  In such 
cases, these courts emphasise the part of the test as to whether there is misappropriation 
through the eyes of the public or specialised field.
35
  In Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. 
McDonalds,
36
 Circuit Judge Carter identified that assessing infringement “raises the 
particular factual issue of the impact of the respective works upon the minds and 
                                                 
28
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 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 ( 1991).  
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imaginations of young people.”37  Nonetheless, there is still overriding emphasis on the 
existing interests of the right holder.  All that is occurring is that their interests are being 
viewed through the eyes of another in terms of infringement – whether there is an adverse 
impact on creative re-use is irrelevant.  The U.S. also provides a right over derivatives. 
Copyright in derivative works will exist “only to the material contributed by the author of 
such work, as distinguished from the pre existing material employed in the work.”38  
Goldstein refers to it as applying from the “point at which the contribution of independent 
expression to an existing work effectively creates a new work for a different market.
39
  This 
would suggest that the right is extremely broad and that this therefore encourages courts to 
focus on the interests of existing right holders.  However, Geller and Nimmer stated that “[i]f 
the right to make derivative works, i.e., the adaptation right, has been infringed, then there is 
necessarily also an infringement of either the reproduction or performance rights.”40  Geller 
and Nimmer were cited with approval in the Twin Peaks
41
 case of the Second Circuit.  The 
derivative right would more accurately be characterised as an additional incentive to create 
derivative work:  “[t]he important point is that, by securing exclusive rights to all derivative 
markets, the statute enables the copyright proprietor to select those toward which it will direct 
investment.”42  
 By encouraging right holders to enter into new markets, the right may be said to be 
extending the scope of copyright protection.  It thus is another way in which right holders 
interests are emphasised to the detriment of the consideration of access to ideas, knowledge, 
and research by those who may wish to creatively re-use a copyright work.  
                                                 
37
 Id. at 1166. 
38
 17 USC § 103(b) (2010). 
39
 Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 209, 
217 (1983).  
40
 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 35.  
41
 Twin Peaks Prods. V. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1373 (2nd Cir. 1993).  See also Alcatel USA, 
Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 787 (5th Cir. 1999). 
42
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3. Ideas and non-original elements  
Copyright does not cover ideas and non-original elements. Both elements could 
enable some consideration of the access to information and research for the purposes of 
creative re-use. However, the bar employed for assessing whether a work is original is so low 
that the issue of originality does not enable this. In the U.K., the requirement of originality 
merely requires that sufficient skill, labour and capital have been invested into a work.
43
  The 
work should originate with the author, and not be copied from another work.
44
  The U.S. has 
similar rules.
45
  Justice O’Connor put it as follows: 
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the 
work was independently created by the author (as opposed to 
copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some 
minimal degree of creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of 
creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.
46
 
 
In the Feist case the “sweat of the brow” test for originality was overridden.47  This 
meant that compilation of facts lost their copyright protection.  The facts consequently 
entered into the public domain.  The case refers to Baker v. Selden, where Justice Bradley 
referred to ‘knowledge.’ 48  He argued that “where the art it teaches cannot be used without 
employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to 
them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and 
                                                 
43
 This is so for literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works.  See COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON 
COPYRIGHT, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: WITH THE STATUTES, ORDERS, CONVENTIONS, AND 
AGREEMENTS THERETO RELATING: AND PRECEDENTS AND COURT FORMS, ALSO RELATED FORMS OF 
PROTECTION 3-25 (E.P. Skone et al. eds., 13th ed. 1991). 
44
 Univ. of London Press Ltd v. Univ. Tutorial Press Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch. 601 at 608. (Eng.). 
45
 See U.S. Copyright Act 1976 § 102, which states “Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this 
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.” 
46
 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).  
        47 Id. at 359. 
         
48
 Id. at 350.  
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given therewith to the public.”49  However, the issue remains that in many cases there can 
still be a creative re-use of a work that is an infringement of a copyright.  
 As clarified in the U.K. by Lord Hoffmann in Designers Guild,
50
 ideas are not 
protected because a) they have no link to the literary, dramatic, musical or artistic nature of 
the work,
51
 or b) that they are not original, or so commonplace so as to not form a substantial 
part of the work.
52
  However, the problem here is that, in terms of re-use, this encompasses 
only certain works.  Extending the scope of the non-protection of ideas does not resolve the 
underlying issue of how to encourage creative re-use of copyright works or repurposing of 
such works.  This problem is highlighted by the U.S. doctrine of scènes à faire.  This doctrine 
“permits authors to use scenes, incidents, or elements in their story that ‘flow from a basic 
plot premise’ even though those elements may come close to elements in existing, 
copyrighted works.”53  However, as the paper has outlined earlier, if there is to be a creative 
re-use of a work, this could involve reproduction of more than ideas, or elements under 
scènes à faire.  If the law is to encourage, for example, the creative re-use of a DVD, then 
this may require reproduction of more than mere ideas, scenes or incidents.  The rules would 
have to be stretched beyond credibility to permit this.  
 
                                                 
49
 Baker v. Seldon 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880).  
50
 Designers Guild v. Williams, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 2416 at 2416 (Eng.). 
51
 Id. at 2423. 
52
 Id.  
53
 Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
923, 950 (1999).  See also Berkic v Crichton 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1985) ((“It is well established 
that, as a matter of law, certain forms of literary expression are not protected against copying.  As noted 
earlier, the general idea for a story is among these. So too are all situations and incidents which flow 
naturally from a basic plot premise, so-called scènes à faire.” (citing Jason v. Fonda 526 F.Supp. 774, 777 
(C.D. Cal 1981) regarding the distinction between expression and ideas)). 
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II. Why should the interests of the re-user be part of the balancing exercise?  
A.  Why re-use copyright content? 
 An ongoing debate has been whether authors create their works individually 
without reference to existing works, or whether authors are reliant upon existing 
works.  The generally accepted view today is that authors do gain inspiration from 
existing works.  As Coombe submits, “the idea of an objective world that can be 
known with certainty by a subject whose capacity for knowledge is independent of 
that world has been repeatedly undermined in recent legal scholarship.”54  As the 
Gowers Review in the U.K. stated,  “Transforming works can create huge value and 
spur on innovation. ‘Good artists borrow; great artists steal.’  So said Pablo Picasso, 
borrowing from Igor Stravinsky, or perhaps from T. S. Eliot.”55 
 Focusing on the interests of those who re-use earlier copyright works in later works 
was an avenue down which English copyright law could have developed.  In the 1774 case of 
Donaldson v Beckett,
56
 Lord Camden referred to conceptions of knowledge.
57
  Although Lord 
Camden did not refer to the well-known philosopher John Locke to support his views, those 
views closely mirror some of Locke’s work.58  The emphasis of Locke’s analysis is on a 
combination of present ideas that furthers our knowledge and results in something creative. 
This is clear when Locke discusses what he considers the purpose of reading, and the 
knowledge that results:  “Reading is for the improvement of the understanding. The 
                                                 
54
 Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and 
Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1857 (1991). 
55
 Andrew Gowers, Gowers Review, of Intellectual Property, 67 (London: HMSO, 2006), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/6/E/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf. 
56
 Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 2 Bro. P. C. 129. 
57
 Id. 
58
 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (20th ed. 1796); JOHN LOCKE, Some 
Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS, 348 (Mark 
Goldie, ed., 1997).  Note that Locke’s Essay has received limited attention in seminal works such as Justin 
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L. J. 287 (1988), but cf. LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA 
OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT (Ashgate Publ’g Ltd., 2007).  
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improvement of the understanding is for two ends: first, for our own increase of knowledge; 
secondly, to enable us to deliver and make out that knowledge to others.”59  This suggests 
that content recipients should be able to access knowledge and re-use the ideas that they may 
glean from existing works.  Locke writes: 
Let us suppose that the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, 
void of all Characters, without any Ideas; How comes it to be 
furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy 
and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost 
endless variety? Whence has it all the materials Reason and 
Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, From Experience: 
In that, all our Knowledge is founded; and from that it 
ultimately derives it self.
60
 
 
Under this system of knowledge, content recipients should be given the option of being able 
to re-use existing works.  However, if we were to permit this to the full degree, then clearly 
the right holders would not receive much in terms of legal protection.  There is a need to 
distil the essence of “knowledge.” 
 “Knowledge” within the context of the re-use of copyright content is best described as 
knowledge that could encourage, or spur, future creativity.  Furthermore, Locke suggests that 
such knowledge is best utilised by accessing the original source.  If this is not done, content 
may become inadvertently altered over time and knowledge lost.
61
  Naturally, that raises the 
question of how to resolve the question of reward to the original right holder. But the 
“knowledge” requirement does not mean that the original work in its entirety be taken out of 
copyright protection.  Indeed, to refer back to a point made earlier, the original right holder 
can be rewarded by still requiring purchase of the original work, or by the payment of 
royalties.  
 If it is accepted that authors do gain inspiration from existing works, it is suggested 
that this should be treated as an integral part of the balancing exercise.  However, the broader 
                                                 
59
 LOCKE, Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman, supra note 58.  
60
 Id. at Book II, ch 1 at § 2.  
61
 Id. at Book IV, ch 1 at § 9 (“The memory is not always so clear as actual perception”).  
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interests of the re-user are marginalised.  As highlighted above, there has been considerable 
emphasis within case law on the existing interests of right holders, rather than on the interests 
of future re-users.  Although copyright law does not protect ideas or non-original elements, in 
the majority of infringement cases there has simply been an insufficient consideration of the 
interests of the re-user.  
 As the interests of re-users should play a role in the copyright balancing exercise, then 
there is a need to quantify what the needs of re-users are.  However, whereas the interests of 
the publishers and the author of a copyright work can be financial, identifiable, and possibly 
tangible, the interests of re-users are more difficult to quantify.  To start with, it is difficult to 
even establish who the amorphous group of re-users are.  They are a diverse group, and so the 
argument may run, their interests are similarly diverse.  Litman makes a similar point about 
the role of the public in copyright law, and it is just as relevant for re-users: “The amorphous 
‘public’ comprises members whose relation to copyright and copyright works varies with the 
circumstances.”62  However, re-users are, by definition, re-using a work in some fashion.  
The main point of contention is how to balance the desire for re-use vis-à-vis the right holder. 
It is suggested that ‘creativity’ can be a useful measuring stick by which to measure re-use.   
 
III. Proposals for reform. 
A. Reform: What the paper proposes? 
 As part of its December 2006 report, the Gowers Review took the bold step of 
highlighting the importance of re-using copyright works. It referred in particular to how the 
U.S. transformative use exception has been important in the development of hip hop music: 
                                                 
62
  Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR.OR. L. REV. 275, 312 
(1989).  
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“Such an exception in U.S. law enabled the hip hop industry to develop in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, allowing producers to sample older works to create a new genre of music and to 
develop an entirely new market.”63  The report proposed that:  “Directive 2001/29/EC be 
amended to allow for an exception for creative, transformative or derivative works, within the 
parameters of the Berne Three-Step Test.”64  
 This paper suggests that it is misplaced to focus too heavily on balancing the 
competing interests of the right holders and content recipients in this way.  As technology is 
permitting ever greater communication of content, yet potentially greater restriction over the 
re-use of that content, it is increasingly difficult to maintain a balance by merely tinkering 
with the system.  The system the paper proposes is radically different from the current system 
in that it departs from providing predominantly negative rights.  The proposed system 
provides a set of rules that, once a work is placed into the market, reduces these rights.  The 
reproduction and adaptation rights will be significantly limited.  Right holders can claim for 
royalties where their works have been re-used for financial gain, or reproduced to a level 
where they are quantitatively substantially similar, but they cannot bring a claim for 
copyright infringement.  It will be argued that this will enable right holders to maintain 
incentives, but still permit re-use of copyright protected content by recipients, encouraging 
them to create.  There are two complementary systems proposed.  The first is for where a 
work that is quantitatively substantially similar to the original, and the second applies where 
there is no quantitatively substantially similar re-use but an element of a copyright work has 
been reproduced.  Both systems provide certainty for re-users of copyright content, and both 
provide a positive right to those who re-use copyright content. 
 The first system, for quantitatively substantially similar works, requires purchase of 
the original unaltered work.  Where the original work has been purchased, the recipient has 
                                                 
63
 Gowers, supra note 55.  
64
  Id. at 68.   
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the positive right to make the altered work available to others who have purchased the 
original.
65
  This is irrespective of the wishes of the right holder.
66
  For instance, a computer 
game may be modified by a content recipient.  The recipient may change code directly or 
create additional elements, for instance, by inserting an extra game level.  He then may sell or 
give away these changed or additional elements.  The original work might then receive wider 
exposure as the altered version may appeal to a more diverse audience, thus encouraging the 
audience to investigate the original out of curiosity.  In addition, there are two other reasons – 
first, the original content may have to be loaded to access the modified versions, and second, 
access to the original could reveal additional content for future modification. 
 An example may be given concerning DVD films.  A recipient could change the 
content (for example, the character Jar Jar Binks was removed from edited versions of Star 
Wars that were available on some peer-to-peer networks).
67
  The content could then be sold, 
either alongside the original DVD or only to those who can demonstrate they held an original 
DVD of the film.  This is not the situation under current laws.  In the U.S., a company called 
CleanFlicks Media Inc. rented out and sold edited DVDs.  These were digitally edited to 
remove profanity, nudity, graphic violence and sexual content.  Even though CleanFlicks 
required the purchase of the original DVDs by customers, thereby compensating the original 
right holders, CleanFlicks were held to be infringing the rights of various directors and movie 
studios by the District Court of Columbia.
68
  CleanFlicks ceased operation on August 31, 
2006.
69
  
                                                 
65
 It is for the right holder to establish if a recipient has not purchased the work.  See infra sec. III, F.  
66
 Subject to moral rights.  See infra III, I. 
67
 SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE ANARCHIST IN THE LIBRARY: HOW THE CLASH BETWEEN FREEDOM AND 
CONTROL IS HACKING THE REAL WORLD AND CRASHING THE SYSTEM 77-78 (New York:  Basic Books, 
2004).  
68
 Clean Flicks of Colo. v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp.2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006).  Directors include Steven 
Spielberg and Sydney Pollack, and the studios MGM and Time Warner.  The purchase of original DVDs on 
a one for one basis is detailed in CleanFlicks, 433 F. Supp.2d at 1238. 
69
 The company has since resumed trading, but only as a seller of films that are “family friendly.” See 
CLEAN FLICKS, friendly, http://www.cleanflicks.com/faqs.php#faq_01 (last visited Aug. 21, 2008). 
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 In some situations a re-use may involve a number of works, for instance as with a 
piece of music combining together many samples.  The paper argues that in such 
circumstances there should be a second system, a fall-back compulsory licensing scheme.
70
 
This also provides content recipients with a positive right to re-use the copyright works.  The 
scheme secures the right holder the income he would otherwise have received.  It is proposed 
that the licence rate should be regulated by the State.  While assessing what an appropriate 
rate should be is likely to be contentious, nonetheless, a system should be able to avoid 
extreme fiscal over-valuation of content.
71
  
B. The Law 
 The main focus of the paper, copyright law, is typically granted for a period of the life 
of the author plus 70 years.
72
  The rights include the right of reproduction and distribution, 
and these are exclusive rights negative in character.
73
  There are different periods of duration 
for the entrepreneurial rights in the U.K.,
74
 and certain other works in the U.S.
75
  In terms of 
scope, what is termed by legislation as a “work” might need to be “recorded,” be “original,” 
have a link to the country concerned and, in the U.K., not be exempted from protection on 
public policy grounds.
76
  
                                                 
70
 See infra sec. III, F. 3. 
71
  In repeating the argument of the U.S. recording industry in favor of compulsory licensing, Bevilacqua 
states “[i]f the compulsory license were repealed, authors and publishers would band together to extract 
exorbitant rates from record labels and drive up transaction costs.” Theresa M. Bevilacqua, Time to Say 
Good-Bye to Madonna’s American Pie: Why Mechanical Compulsory Licensing Should be Put to Rest, 19 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 285, 295 (2001).  The U.S. has a limited form of compulsory licensing for 
sound recordings once they are made available to the public. Id. 
72
 In the U.K., see s. 12(2) CDPA 1988 as amended by the Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 
(harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights); in the US, see Copyrights, 17 
U.S.C  § 302(a) (1998). 
73
 Compare s.16 CDPA 1988 and 17 U.S.C. § 106; see COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT 1-31 
(K.M. Garnett et al. eds., 15th ed. 2005).  
74
 Entrepreneurial works cover sound recordings, broadcasts, and the typographical format of published 
editions – s.5A-s.8 CDPA 1988.     
75
  For corporate works or posthumous works, see e.g. 17 U.S.C. § 304. (1998). 
76
  In the U.K. s.1 CDPA 1988 contains the categories, s.3(2) requires recording of literary, dramatic and 
musical works, § 1(1)(a) states that literary, dramatic musical or artistic works need to be original, and Part 
II Chapter IV of the Act deals with qualification.  For public policy see COPINGER, supra note 43, at 3 – 25; 
see inter alia A.G. v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd., [1988] All E.R.ER 545. (Eng.); British Oxygen Co. Ltd. 
V. v Liquid Air Ltd., [1925] Ch. 383 (Eng.); Glynn v. Weston Film Feature, [1916] 1 Ch 261 (Eng.).  For 
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 As a result of the development of digital technology, there are an increasing number 
of technically enforced mechanisms used (i.e. not legal protection per se) by right holders to 
protect their works from the easy reproduction that digital technology can enable.  Such 
mechanisms can extend protection beyond the scope of copyright law.  They may prevent 
access to, and reproduction of, computer code that contains unoriginal elements. 
 These mechanisms have been given additional protection in the U.K. under s.296-
s.296ZF of the CDPA 1988,
77
 which implement the Information Society Directive (EUCD) of 
2001,
 78
 and in the U.S. there is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998.
79
 
The EUCD and DMCA implement a provision in Art 11 WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996.
80
 
Circumvention mechanisms are prohibited under the CDPA
81
 and DMCA.
82
  The result is 
that if a work is protected by a DRM mechanism, even if that mechanism provides protection 
beyond the scope of copyright law, it is often not permissible for a recipient to circumvent the 
mechanism.  
 This paper advocates that content recipients should be able to distribute altered 
versions of right holder’s content.  If a DRM mechanism inhibits this, then knowledge as to 
how to re-use DRM protected works should also be permitted to be publicly available, even if 
that would reveal how to circumvent the DRM mechanism.
83
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the U.S., see 17 U.S.C. § 101, § 102, and § 104 (1998). 
77
  s.296-s.296ZF CDPA 1988. 
78
 Directive 2001/29 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation 
of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L. 167), art. 6 
(EUCD), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:167:0010:0019:EN:PDF; Copyright and Related 
Rights Regulations, 2003, S.I. 2003/2498 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/2498/contents/made (implementing the EUCD in the U.K.) 
79
   Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1202 (1998). 
80
 Art 11 states “Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies 
against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with 
the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of 
their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.”  WIPO Copyright 
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997). 
81
  s.296ZB CDPA 1988 (implementing Art 6(2) of the EUCD). 
82
  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, §§ 1201-1202.  
83
 See infra at III, J. 3. 
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C. Implementing the new system 
 There is a need to move away from the concept of copyright as a negative right, and 
to move to a system that also provides content recipients with the positive right to re-use 
copyright content.  Content recipients should hold an additional positive right, requiring that 
access should be granted as far as necessary for a creative re-use.
84
  The proposed reforms to 
the U.K. and U.S. copyright system will concentrate on two main issues.  First of all, there is 
a need to consider in what manner right holders could be compensated if their work is re-
used.  Second, there is a need to consider how to ensure the proposed system is encouraging 
creative re-use.  To this end, a set of criteria will be outlined.  Having achieved this, the paper 
will then move on to considering what body would be the most appropriate in administering 
the proposed system.  
 
D. The importance of key values in balancing. 
 The ability to re-use content is affected by the nature of the technology in which the 
work is enshrined.  Other factors such as the market, norms and law influence the amount of 
re-use possible,
85
 but it is ultimately the technology of a work that enables or disables certain 
uses.  For example, a film recorded on celluloid can be edited but is likely to require specific 
editing skills in cutting film
86
 whereas a digital movie could be edited in more ways using 
digital technology.
87
  Digital technology has the potential to permit more changes to be made 
to a reproduction of a work. 
 As technology has developed content recipients have been able to manipulate existing 
works in an increasing number of ways.  Digital technology allows greater interaction with 
                                                 
84
 Id.  
85
  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (New York: Basic Books, 1999). 
         
86
 See inter alia, Video Edit Magic 4.47, DESKSHARE, 
http://www.deskshare.com/Resources/articles/vem_UsefulEditingTechniques.aspx (last visited Jan 7, 2011).  
87
 See DIGITAL VIDEO EDITING, http://videoediting.digitalmedianet.com/ (last visited Jan 7, 2010). 
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works, not just as the original creator or right holder intended but also in ways that might 
provide new experiences or information.  For instance, a computer game could be rendered 
alterable by third party software, changing the manner in which it is played.
88
  The content 
recipient may access and alter code directly to change their experience, which is entirely 
consistent with Lockean notions of knowledge. Locke states that it is in experience that all 
knowledge is founded.
89
  Furthermore, it is consistent with the notion that the work should be 
accessible, and permit observation of its workings. 
 It was suggested earlier that the current copyright regimes place too much emphasis 
on the existing interests of right holders.  Copyrights provide right holders with negative 
rights.
90
  These negative rights include inter alia the exclusive rights of reproduction, of 
distribution, in the U.K. adaptation, and in the U.S., derivation.
91
  The courts place too much 
emphasis on assessing copyright infringement, and the potential effects on the existing 
interests of the right holders.  
 The current systems do not adequately consider the interests of content recipients. 
They are designed to protect existing right holder’s interests, which mirrors Lockean 
conceptions of reward for labour.
92
  The copyright system is not designed to identify the 
stages involved in the re-use of earlier copyright works.
93
  The proposed system differs in this 
respect, in that it provides a framework designed to encourage more creative re-uses.  This 
marks a move away from providing negative rights, to providing positive rights for content 
recipients.  
                                                 
88
  Kevin Poulsen, Hackers Sued for Tinkering with Xbox Games, SKINNED ALIVE (Feb. 10, 2005, 10:20 
GMT), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/10/. 
89
 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 58, Book IV, Chapter 1 at 
§9. (20th ed. 1796). 
90
  COPINGER, supra note 73 at 1-31.  
91
 For the rights in the U.K. see s.16 CDPA 1988, and for rights in the U.S. see Visual Artists Rights Act of 
1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A.  For discussion see supra Section I. B. 
92
 Locke, J., ‘The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration’, supra 58 Chapter 
V. 
93
  See supra Section I. 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
 However, increasing the amount of re-use could, if implemented in a way that does 
not encourage initial creative works, stifle the creative process.  This point has been put 
forward by Landes and Posner in economic terms.
94
  They suggest that if legal copyright 
protection reaches a certain level, for instance in the costs of rights clearing, this will reduce 
the number of works being created.  In turn, this will limit the amount of stimuli for future 
works thereby limiting future creativity. There is therefore a need to consider how to provide 
a system which compensates existing authors, but which has as its primary aim the 
encouragement of more creative re-uses. 
 
E.  An outline of the proposed systems: Changes and incentives. 
 The distribution of works that re-use copyright content is where the interests of right 
holders and content recipients clearly collide.  Digital technology, by permitting widespread, 
cheap and easy distribution, alongside ease of making changes to existing works, means that 
more content recipients can enter into competition with the right holder of the earlier work. 
Putting aside questions of intellectual property law and licensing, if a company were to sell 
edited DVDs in order to remove potentially offensive content, without requiring purchase of 
the original DVDs, then some individuals would choose those over the originals.  The 
original right holder would not be compensated.  
             There is a need to consider how to compensate right holders for the re-use of their 
works, whilst encouraging re-use of those works by others.  The paper proposes significant 
curtailment of the negative rights of copyright holders, and consequently, the property right 
that copyright provides.  It advocates significant reduction in the rights of reproduction, 
distribution, and in the U.K., adaptation and, in the U.S., derivation.
95
  Right holders will be 
                                                 
94
  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 
325, 326-332 (1989). 
95
 In the U.K. s.16 CDPA 1988, and in the U.S., see, Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, § 106A. 
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unable to bring an action for infringement of the reproduction, adaptation or derivation right 
against re-users.
96
  Likewise, the performance right will be limited if it inhibits re-uses that 
are otherwise permitted under the proposed system.  The distribution right is reduced in that 
if a content recipient is unable to purchase a work, a royalty may be paid instead.  Although 
rental of works will remain possible, it cannot be used in any way contrary to the proposed 
system.  It cannot be used in conjunction with licences that restrict content recipients’ re-use 
of a work.  The reduction of these rights may result in a breach of international obligations, 
and that aspect is discussed later in this paper.
97
 
             Content recipients will be given the positive right to re-use a copyright work.  The 
right will provide greater certainty than the current law as to which re-uses are to be 
permitted.  Another positive right will also allow those content recipients’ access to works 
protected by DRM so far as necessary for a creative re-use.
98
  This paper agrees with the 
contention of Cohen that “copyright should recognise the situated, context-dependent 
character of both consumption and creativity, and the complex interrelationships between 
creative play, the play of culture, and progress, and should adjust its baseline rules – not 
simply its exceptions – accordingly.”99  
                In order to balance the positive rights given to content recipients, right holders may 
make use of the following rights. The following rights provide certainty both to right holders 
and to content recipients.  These are: 1) financial rights, and 2) moral rights.  These basic 
rights may be described as follows.  ‘Financial rights’ are those that enable right holders to be 
able to claim money for the re-use of their works.  This may be done in a number of ways, 
such as through requiring purchase of original works, or alternatively through levies and 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
96
 See supra Section III. C. 
97
 See infra Section IV. 
98
 See infra Section III. J. 2. 
99
  Julie E. Cohen, Intellectual Property and Public Values: The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 374 (2005). 
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licensing.  ‘Moral rights’ covers those rights discussed in the U.K. CDPA 1988,100 and those 
present in the U.S.
101
  Moral rights rest with the author, and protect them against derogatory 
treatment, and provide other rights such as the right to be named as author or not to be 
named.  In the U.K. and U.S. these have had minimal influence, although in continental 
Europe moral rights are considerably more central to copyright litigation.  
          A reformed copyright system should encourage creative re-use of copyright works.  
The reform proposed by this paper consists of two inter-related systems.  The systems are 
designed to apply to both digital and analogue technologies.
102
  The proposed systems will 
apply whenever there is a work in which copyright subsists, and it will not be possible to 
contract out of them. 
 The first system is one for quantitatively substantially similar works.  A content 
recipient has the right to distribute a quantitatively substantially similar work, provided that 
he or she has purchased the original.  Where a work is not quantitatively substantially similar, 
a system of compulsory licensing will be applied.  Again, the content recipient has the right 
to re-use the altered work.  The exact dividing line between the systems is discussed later.
103
 
If purchase of the original is not possible, the money owed to the right holder will be the right 
holder’s advertised purchase price at the time of the re-use.  The royalty rate for non- 
quantitatively substantially similar uses will be a percentage of that figure.  If there is no such 
rate, then a standard rate set by an administrative body will be applied.  The royalty is only to 
                                                 
100
  Chapter IV CDPA 1988.  
101
 Limited protection exists through case law (Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d 
Cir. 1976), the Visual Artists Rights Act 1990, state statutes and through the derivative right in Visual 
Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A .  
102
 In terms of “technology neutrality’, while the two systems do not explicitly discriminate between digital 
and analogue technologies, the effect may be different in that more varied re-uses are favoured by digital 
technology.  As Reed argues, it is crucial to take notice of the effects of regulation in assessing technology 
neutrality-neutrality.  Chris Reed, Taking Sides on Technology Neutrality, 4:3 SCRIPTED 263, 267 (2007), 
available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol4-3/reed.asp. 
103
 Infra Section III. G. 
22 
 
 
 
 
    be 
23 
 
 
 
 
be paid for non-quantitatively similar re-uses, if the re-use is for “financial gain.”104  
 A consequence of the proposed system is that re-users seeking to make a re-use of an 
earlier work for “financial gain” may try to ensure that their work is substantially 
quantitatively similar to avoid paying any royalty.  There is a chance this will result in less 
creative re-uses, and cheap copies of elements of existing works.  However, if re-use of a 
quantitatively substantially similar work involves a sale, or rental, of the altered version, then 
the re-user is under a duty to check that recipients of the altered version have purchased the 
original.  Otherwise, they will be liable to the right holder of the original work for lost 
sales.
105
  This may limit the number of works sold under that system, though the impact may 
be less for widely distributed original works.  Nonetheless, it is suggested that this is an 
acceptable trade off because current stakeholders will benefit from the proposed system in 
several ways.  
 Authors will benefit in that they will have a legally guaranteed income when 
commercial re-uses of their works are made.  It will also be easier for them to know what 
quantity of an earlier copyright work they can re-use. Publishers will benefit through 
increased sales of original works, and they will receive more royalties. This is because where 
works are quantitatively substantially similar purchase of the original is required, and where a 
work is not, royalties will have to be paid if re-use is for financial gain.
106
 There will also be 
greater exposure of the original work, if it is quantitatively substantially similar.  Content 
recipients will know whether purchase of the original or a licence is required, and they will 
also have greater certainty as to which acts they can use their positive rights for.
107
  Those 
who produce circumvention mechanisms will also know for what acts they may produce 
                                                 
104
 Infra Section III. F. 3. 
105
 Infra Section III. F. 1. 
106
 Infra Section III. F. 3. 
107
 Infra Section III. J. 3.   
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those mechanisms.
108
  File sharing networks will benefit in that the law is more certain, and 
therefore they can plan their activities around particular uses.
109
  
 However, the proposed systems present some issues. As outlined earlier in this 
section, authors who hold copyright will lose some control over their works, primarily in 
terms of reproduction, and in the U.K. adaptation, and in the U.S. derivation.  Nonetheless, 
this paper contends that authors will benefit from increased sales because for quantitatively 
substantially similar works purchase of the original is required.
110
 Furthermore, the system 
guarantees income for commercial re-uses where the work is not quantitatively substantially 
similar.
111
  Publishers will also lose control over their works, but they benefit in the same way 
as authors who are also right holders.  Re-users will benefit because they will be provided 
with the positive right to re-use the work, which will provide them with greater certainty.
112
 
F. The proposed systems. 
1 Quantitatively substantially similar works. 
One of the key problems for right holders of copyright works is that re-used materials can 
be widely spread on the Internet without their consent.  The Internet has the characteristic of 
“network effects,” where the use of one particular piece of content results in a greater 
likelihood of that content being used by others.
113
  A content recipient may re-use copyright 
content in a film – e.g. Star War’s Phantom Edit – and this may spread very quickly across 
the Internet.  This potential threat has led to right holders using DRM mechanisms to prevent 
such alterations 
                                                 
108
 Infra Section III. J. 3. 
109
 See infra Section III. F. 3 (discussing re-uses where there is no ‘financial gain’). 
110
 Infra Section III. F.1. 
111
 Infra Section III. F. 3. 
112
 Infra Section III. J. 
113
 For discussion see HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION, AT 1971 (Mark Armstrong & Robert 
Porter eds., North-Holland, vol. 3, 2007).   
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 Content recipients, who make a quantitatively substantially similar re-use of a 
copyright work, should have a positive right to re-use that work.  This is subject to the re-user 
having purchased the original work. If the re-use involves a sale (or rental) of the re-used 
version, then the re-user is under a duty to check that their recipients have purchased the 
original.
114
  If a re-user makes a re-use without purchasing the original work, or if in selling 
the re-used version does not check that the recipients have purchased the original, then a right 
holder may bring an action before a court or proposed administrative body against the re-
user. The right holder can claim for the lost purchases of the work. They can also claim for 
damages.  
 This system is designed to increase sales for the original right holder, by taking 
advantage of “network effects.”  However, the proposed system substantially restricts the 
rights of reproduction, adaptation (in the U.K.), and derivation (in the U.S.).  As noted 
earlier,
115
 the copyright balancing exercise will move from one that provides right holders 
with rights of a negative character, to one that also provides positive rights for content 
recipients.  This may run afoul of the Berne Convention
116
 and the rights it guarantees (for an 
in-depth discussion, see below).
117
  Nonetheless, current right holders will still have the right 
to prosecute individuals for failing to purchase the original work, or for not paying the 
royalties required.  Providing content recipients with the positive right to re-use a work 
enables them to clearly understand that they can re-use a copyright work, provided they have 
purchased the original.  
                                                 
114
 The ‘financial gain test’ for non-quantitatively substantially similar works (see infra Section III. F. 3.) is 
not used here. This is because the proposed system can be simpler as there is only one original work. 
Simplicity is important because the penalties involved may be greater. 
115
 Supra Section III. E. 
116
 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on 
July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) (The 1979 amended version does not 
appear in UNTS or ILM, but the 1971 Paris revision is available at 1161 UNTS 30 (1971)), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html. 
117
 Infra Section IV. 
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  In anticipation of objections from current right holders, it can be noted that there is 
precedence for such a distribution model within the U.K. and U.S.  Many computer games 
permit alterations of the way in which they work, and this has been put forward as a way to 
increase sales.
118
  In so doing, publishers are relying on the network effects of the popularity 
of their games – the more popular a particular modified version of a game becomes, the more 
sales of the original will increase.
119
  This was demonstrated with the Half Life 2 videogame 
that had consistently strong sales because of modifications that were permitted by the 
EULA.
120
 
 
2. Case Study. 
 The Clean Flicks company is one that would have benefited under the proposed laws.  
CleanFlicks Media Inc. rented out, and sold edited DVDs.  These were edited to remove 
profanity, nudity, graphic violence, and sexual content.  For each DVD sold, Clean Flicks 
purchased, or required purchase by a consumer, a copy of the original work.  Clean Flicks 
were ultimately held to be infringing the rights of certain Hollywood copyright holders.
121
 
 Under the proposed system, Clean Flicks would have the right to distribute edited 
versions of DVDs, if the original had been purchased.  However, customers should purchase 
a DVD (or Clean Flicks on their behalf).  Clean Flicks will need to check whether the 
customers had purchased the original.  
 However, in the online context, there are too many situations where it would be 
unreasonable to expect the non-commercial re-user of copyright content to check whether the 
original content had been purchased.  For instance, in relation to computer games, it could be 
                                                 
         
118
 Infra Section IV. 
119
 Id. 
120
 Id., and Steam Subscriber Agreement, http://store.steampowered.com/subscriber_agreement/  (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2011). 
121
  Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006).   
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difficult for a content re-user posting edited content on to the Internet to know whether or not 
the recipient has an authorised copy of that game.  If a right holder discovers the original has 
not been purchased, minor punitive penalties could be imposed.
122
  Such penalties may be 
increased if commercial piracy is involved.
123
  The administrative system outlined below
124
 
would keep legal costs down to a minimum so that they would not become prohibitive. 
 
3. The second system. 
The model just described will only apply to those works that that are substantially 
quantitatively similar to an earlier original work.  The situation is less clear with works that 
are a result of remixing, where there is no clear single original work.
125
 It would seem 
excessive that use of a one second sample, no matter how evocative, would require the 
purchase of an original sound recording.  
 One manner in which this could be achieved would be through the introduction of 
levies.  Germany, for instance, introduced a system of levies on goods such as blank CDs, the 
money from which would then be redistributed to right holders.
126
  In relation to p2p, Netanel 
has put forward the argument of a non-commercial use levy.
127
  The levy would be “imposed 
on all consumer goods and services the value of which is substantially enhanced by p2p file 
swapping.”128  The goals behind Netanel's levy system is similar to those put forward by the 
                                                 
122
 Directive 2004/48/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L. 157), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:157:0045:0086:EN:PDF.  The system paperis 
designed to prevent content recipients distributing works with minor alterations to benefit from the “not for 
financial profit” exemption under the proposed compulsory licensing scheme.  Infra Section III. F. 3. 
123
 Id.  
124
 Infra Section V. 
125
 The exception would be for those works where, for example, there is a remix of a South Park episode 
not based on any particular South Park episode, but which has an identifiable right holder. However, for 
the sake of certainty the second system should be used. 
126
 Katerina Gaita & Andrew F. Christie, Principle or Compromise?: Understanding the Original Thinking 
Behind Statutory Licence and Levy Scheme for Private Copying, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 422, 430 (2004).   
         
127
 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing,    
 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 21 (2003).          
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paper – namely, that it aims to “give non-commercial users and creators freedom to explore, 
share, and modify many of the expressive works that populate our culture.”129  Fisher has also 
put forward similar arguments – he supports the introduction of a levy or tax which is 
redistributed to right holders based on quantitative re-use.
130
  However, the largest criticism 
that such systems have to overcome is that they act as a blanket mechanism.  Netanel seeks to 
refute the key criticisms in relation to his proposed levy, those criticisms being that:  “[it] 
could not yield sufficient funds to compensate copyright holders without imposing 
unpalatable costs on consumers. The second is that [it] would unfairly and inefficiently 
require low volume users of copyright protected material to subsidize both copyright owners 
and high volume users.”131  Whilst Netanel makes an admirable attempt to refute these 
criticisms,
132
 it is submitted that the system of compulsory licensing proposed below carries 
the benefits of a levy system, but without the risk of the above drawbacks.  
 There is already a narrow form of compulsory licensing in the U.S., under §115.
133
 
This system has had limited impact.
134
  The current system of licensing impedes the re-use of 
copyright content.  For instance, with `Paul’s Boutique,’ released in 1989, the Beastie Boys 
pioneered the use of dense sampling.  However, subsequent Beastie Boys albums have not 
followed this same technique, because of the high transaction costs necessary for a label to 
clear the work for release.
135
 
 A different compulsory licensing system could be implemented where a later work is 
not quantitatively substantially similar to an original work on which it is based.  The 
compulsory licensing royalty rate should be assessed as according to the quantity of the 
                                                 
129
 Id. at 6 
130
  WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP, (Stanford, Calif.:  Stanford Law and Politics, 2004) Chapter 6. 
131
 Netanel, supra note 127 at 7. 
132
  Id., at 59-74. 
133
 17 U.S.C. §115. 
134
  See supra Section I. B.2. 
135
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copyrighted elements re-used from the original work.  In so doing, there will be greater 
certainty for the re-user of the content than if it is based upon the ‘recognisability’ of the 
sample.  To focus on recognisability, as is the current process, introduces uncertainty into the 
system.
136
  
 Under the compulsory licensing system it would be the content re-user who has to pay 
the royalty once the re-used work is being sold.  As a result, the system can still dissuade the 
recipient of content re-using that work and distributing it.  Those seeking to distribute content 
that re-uses copyright content might feel compelled to base their works upon a single original 
work, as opposed to mixing in re-used work from a number of original sources, because they 
have already purchased that work.  This could be undesirable as it has the potential to 
discourage certain types of re-use such as the wide use of samples in musical works.  
 In order to balance this, it is proposed that the compulsory licensing system would 
only be applied to those works sold for financial profit, or resulting in significant income. 
The key to preventing discouragement of certain types of creative re-use is to specifically 
define what is meant by financial profit. The approach used by Justice Souter in Grokster
137
 
is informative:
138
  
In addition to this evidence of express promotion, marketing, 
and intent to promote further, the business models employed by 
Grokster and StreamCast confirm that their principal object was 
use of their software to download copyrighted works. Grokster 
and StreamCast receive no revenue from users, who obtain the 
software itself for nothing. Instead, both companies generate 
income by selling advertising space, and they stream the 
advertising to Grokster and Morpheus users while they are 
employing the programs. .. While there is doubtless some 
demand for free Shakespeare, the evidence shows that 
substantive volume is a function of free access to copyrighted 
work.
139
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However, a subsequent work could become well known without sufficiently compensating 
the original creator under the proposed system – works could be made for ‘fun,’ not for 
profit, and therefore not provide any monetary reward for the original artist.  As Hughes 
comments, “some recordings approach or overpower the originals, whether or not the original 
was propertised.  Which had the greater audience over time – New York City’s I Love New 
York song, or Saturday Night Live’s I Love Sodom parody – considering the latter still sells 
on video?”140   In addition, some works have become well known through only one small part 
of the work, as in the Colonel Bogey
141
 case, rather than the whole work, which a system 
based around the quantity of re-use would not compensate to the level of one based around 
qualitative re-use. 
 Nonetheless, the paper argues this is an acceptable trade-off.  In regard to right 
holders, it is exposing their works to a greater degree that may increase sales of the original. 
For re-users of content, it will mean that they are freer to sample and adapt pieces from 
existing works.  There will be greater certainty and clarity as to when works can be re-used. 
At the same time, the existing right holders are protected from unauthorised reproductions by 
the requirements to purchase original copies of their works where there is quantitative 
substantial similarity. 
 In addition to this, the system of compulsory licences should be implemented in a way 
that does not discourage the re-use of existing works.  If a large quantity of a work is re-used, 
then a proportionately greater percentage of royalties could be required.  It would be for the 
proposed administrative body to set the rates, but an example could be if 20% of an earlier 
work’s copyrighted elements are re-used, 20% royalties would be required, whereas a 50% 
re-use would incur a 70% royalty.
  
A scheme of royalty rates would be made public, so that 
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content recipients know what monies they would have to pay if the re-use is for financial 
gain.  It would have to be stressed that the scheme applies only to those works which are not 
quantitatively substantially similar to an earlier work.  If it is quantitatively substantially 
similar to an earlier work, then the scheme outlined above in section III F1 will apply.  The 
two systems will complement each other in that a 60% re-use should incur a 100% royalty – 
above that rate, the quantitatively substantially similar scheme will apply. 
 In terms of rights and liabilities between re-users, the royalty will be assessed 
according to the earlier copyright work that is re-used, so the royalty paid will revert back to 
the previous right holder.  If there is a dispute, this will be resolved by the proposed 
administrative body, or if necessary, a court.  There is an exception where there has been re-
use which was not for “financial gain” – this is to ensure that those who initially re-used a 
large percentage of a work for non commercial reasons are not suddenly expected to pay 
royalties. If that happened, it could discourage many re-uses. For instance, if one re-user 
copied 90% of a work for non-commercial reasons (bringing it within the quantitatively 
substantially similar system) he would only need to purchase one copy of the work.  
However, if his use was to be deemed for “financial gain” because a re-user of his work who 
copied 25% distributed a commercial version of it, the first re-user would have to purchase 
one work for every re-use.  The royalties the first re-user would receive would not be enough 
to cover the royalties owed to the original right holder.  Consequently, the paper suggests that 
royalties will pass to the earlier commercial re-user.  Thus, the 25% royalties owed by the 
second re-user will pass directly to the original right holder.
142
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4. Case Studies. 
 A piece of commercial (for profit) music that combines together many samples would 
be the typical situation where the proposed compulsory licensing system would apply.  A 
musician may decide to combine together, for example, 15 samples.  Under the proposed 
system, he has the right to distribute the resulting work. Each sample would be quantitatively 
judged against the original work.  If one of the samples quantitatively consists of 20% of the 
original, then 20% royalties may be paid.  If another comprises 50% of the original, then it is 
possible that a 70% royalty is required in order to deter larger reproductions.  The royalty rate 
itself would be dependent on the length, and type, of work so as not to deter re-use of shorter 
works.
143
  This would also resolve the problem of requiring large royalty payments for works 
that make use of ‘dense sampling.’  For instance, ‘Paul’s Boutique,’ a piece of music which 
made use of many samples, could pay a lower royalty rate due to its creative nature.  
  Another example could involve film.  A content recipient produces a reworked 
version of Star Wars.  Again, the content recipient has a right to distribute the altered version. 
Two main action sequences are reproduced - the attack on Hoth and the Death Star 
exploding.  Minor additions to these sequences are achieved by adding in additional graphics. 
The text from the introduction and credits has been copied, and 20% of the music has been 
reproduced, 50% of the plot is the same.  The rest of the film does not contain earlier 
copyright elements.  Under the proposed system, the amount of royalties to be paid is directly 
related to the quantity of the re-used copyright elements.  The amount of frame time given to 
the action sequences and text would be worked out as a quantitative percentage of the 
original work - as would reproduction of the music and the plot.  Provided that the 
reproduction does not result in the work being considered quantitatively substantially similar 
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to any of the earlier works on which it is based, a prescribed royalty would then be paid.  If it 
is quantitatively substantially similar, then the original work will need to be purchased.  
 
G. Deciding whether an original should be purchased or whether the compulsory licensing 
system should be used. 
 There are some instances that could arise where it is not clear which system should be 
used.  If an individual has posted a music remix of an earlier song with some other elements 
from other songs onto the Internet, should this be considered to be based on one single 
original source or possibly a remix of several?  What if, for instance, it was a remix of a well-
known song? 
 In the test of substantial similarity by quantity, if the later work is quantitatively 
substantially similar to a work on which it is based, then the original work has to be 
purchased once.  This percentage would be determined by the proposed administrative body.  
However, the paper suggests as a starting point that once 60% (or more) of an original work 
is reproduced, it is substantially quantitatively similar.  If two works are reproduced at 60% 
each, then the substantial quantitative similarity test would still apply, requiring the purchase 
of both.  The content re-user can nominate what the earlier works were – this is in order to 
restrict the possibility of right holders using quantitatively smaller, earlier, works to limit 
creative re-use.  If there is disagreement as to what the earlier work was, the proposed 
administrative body or the courts could try the issue on a case-by-case basis, under the 
principles of creative re-use discussed below.
144
  If a work is not purchasable, then a standard 
royalty rate set by the proposed administrative body will apply. 
 The figure of 60% as the point at which a work is quantitatively substantially similar 
has been chosen because this will deter less creative re-uses.  That figure can be changed by 
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the proposed administrative body, and could be changed subject to further scrutiny.
145
  If less 
than 60% of the original work has been reproduced, the system of compulsory licensing 
should be applied.
146
  Under that system, an individual may distribute an altered version 
without paying the royalty, provided it is not sold for financial gain, or resulting in significant 
income.
147
  If it is for financial gain or results in financial profit, then the compulsory 
licensing system should operate so that the more a work is derived from an original, the 
greater the royalty should be.  At a point determined by the proposed administrative body, the 
combination of royalties could exceed the purchase price of the original work.  This is to 
encourage more creative re-uses, and to discourage minor editing of the original work solely 
in order to produce cheaper versions.  
 For example, if a Star Wars film is reproduced and this constitutes 60% of the original 
work, then this would fall under the quantitative substantial similarity test.  If two Star Wars 
films were reproduced in equal portions, with 50% of each, this would fall under the 
compulsory licensing test.  When the re-used work is sold for profit or resulting in significant 
financial income, then the royalty rate would be imposed. The royalty rate would be 
proportionally higher with a 50% re-use than, for example, a 20% re-use.  A re-use of 50% of 
the original work could incur a 70% royalty.  In this example, a total of 140% royalties would 
accrue.  
 What about works where, for instance, separate re-users have made 20% of a work 
available in unmodified form?  This could conceivably result in a situation where 100% of a 
work has been made available from five different sources.  However, because each re-user 
has only taken 20%, they would not be liable to make any royalty payments.  Consequently, 
the original right holder would be deprived of revenue.  It is suggested that any re-use of a 
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work in this manner would, in fact, be considered as resulting in ‘financial gain.’148  This is 
because any network allowing such uploads would be, per the Grokster test, “[substantively] 
free access to copyrighted work.”149  The test for ‘financial gain’ is sufficiently flexible to 
deal with such situations, and therefore there is no need for any specific rules. 
 
H. How to assess the position of end users in relation to re-use. 
 Under the proposed systems, content recipients have the right to alter files and then 
upload them.  In turn, other recipients may wish to alter those files again, and then let others 
upload them.  This raises questions as to the legal relationships between the re-users.  
 All re-users will be treated as non-infringers.  The reason for treating them as non-
infringers is because to do otherwise could result in the balancing exercise being undermined. 
It has been outlined earlier that the potential threat of copyright infringement proceedings has 
been a factor in chilling some creative re-uses.
150
  Those who reuse content will be treated as 
licensees.  Right holders can still initiate legal action against content recipients for royalties 
owed to them under the proposed system, or where appropriate to obtain financial 
compensation equivalent to purchase of the original work.  The proposed system will lay 
down rules as to how unpaid royalties may be collected, and it is only this system that can be 
used to gain such monies.  Punitive penalties may need to be imposed by an administrative 
body so that content recipients will actively pay the royalties required and purchase the 
original work where necessary. 
 There is the associated question of to whom a content re-user pays royalties.  For 
instance, if two individuals (‘A’ and ‘B’) have commercially re-used 25% of a work each, 
and another user (‘C’) then combines the two to make a commercial re-use of 50%, does this 
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mean that either a) royalties are to be paid by C to A and B, or that b) C is to pay royalties to 
the original right holder (‘R’)?   The proposed system requires that the royalty goes to the last 
author.  This could be a re-user, or the initial creator.  It is then for that last author to then 
pass royalties on to the author whose work they have re-used (or, of course, the initial 
creator).  If there is any dispute, it is for a court or the proposed administrative body to decide 
who the last author was.  
 In order to demonstrate the operation of the system, a more complicated situation can 
be introduced.  ‘A’ has reproduced 90% of a work and distributed it on the Internet without 
financial gain.  Assume that ‘B’ has, for non-commercial reasons, made a 25% re-use of ‘A’s 
reproduction.  ‘C’ has taken that re-use and made insignificant changes (i.e. a 100% re-use), 
and has commercially sold the work.  ‘D’ has then taken 10% of that work, and re-used it in a 
commercial work.  What royalties are owed?  To begin with, it is necessary to exclude any 
re-uses that are not for “financial gain.”  ‘A’ and ‘B’ are therefore excluded from the analysis. 
‘D’, however, owes royalties to ‘C,’ because the re-use is commercial. Regarding ‘C,’ 
because ‘B’ and ‘A’ are excluded, royalty payments will go to the next nearest creator, which 
is the original right holder.  The royalty owed will accord to the percentage taken (in this 
case, the percent of the original work taken is 22.5% - 25% of 90%). 
I. Moral rights. 
 A different approach towards balancing may impinge upon the territory of moral 
rights.  In the U.K., moral rights are a recent addition: 
The term “Moral Rights,” introduced into English law by 
Chapter IV of the 1988 Act, has its origins in the “droit moral” 
enjoyed by authors in various European countries, notably 
France, Germany and Italy. It refers collectively to a number of 
rights which are more of a personal than commercial character 
and are not normally included in the term “copyright.”151 
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These rights reside with the author and if a court finds a breach of them there will be a 
statutory sanction.
152
  In the U.K., moral rights include the right to be named as author, or not 
to be so named, and a right against derogatory treatment of a work, as defined by the CDPA 
1988.
153
 
 The U.S. Copyright Act does not specifically refer to moral rights, however, there is a 
mention of them in the Visual Artists Rights Act 1990
154
 and case law.
155
  Although they 
provide a set of rights alongside the traditional economic rights, in both the U.K. and the 
U.S., the rights have not been widely used.  
 To date the U.K. has restrictively interpreted moral rights.  To begin with, there is a 
system of consent and waiver within the CDPA 1988.
156
  This puts authors in a weak 
bargaining position vis-à-vis publishers when seeking publication of their works.  An author 
may have to waive his rights or consent to certain uses of his work.  Even if he can, and does, 
decide to exercise his moral rights, they have been construed restrictively by the courts.  In 
the U.K. case of Tidy v. Trustees of the National History Museum
157
 resizing of a cartoon 
with different colour backings was insufficient to be considered derogatory treatment; 
likewise, “what the plaintiff must establish is that the treatment accorded to his work is either 
a distortion or a mutilation that prejudices his honour or reputation as an artist.  It is not 
sufficient that the author is himself aggrieved by what has occurred.”158  Trivial changes are 
also insufficient.
159
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 In the U.S., the Gilliam v. ABC
160
 case applied the right of integrity.  When discussing 
the “actionable mutilation” of Monty Pythons work, Judge Lumbard  stated, “[t]his cause of 
action, which seeks redress for deformation of an artist's work, finds its roots in the 
continental concept of droit moral, or moral right, which may generally be summarized as 
including the right of the artist to have his work attributed to him in the form in which he 
created it.”161  
 The development of moral rights was piecemeal.  There is the right to be named 
author in some state statutes,
162
 and statutory protection exists through the Visual Artists 
Rights Act of 1990, which inserted 17 USC §106A into the US Code.  Under that provision, 
authors of a “work of visual art” have the rights of attribution, integrity,163 and the right to 
prevent destruction of works of “recognised stature.”164  There is also protection provided 
with the derivative right. 
 This paper proposes a system that is designed to increase creative re-uses of copyright 
works.  The question this raises is whether moral rights have the potential to undermine the 
proposed system.  There are two possible outcomes, either that:  a) the system of moral rights 
remains peripheral; or b) authors assert their moral rights more regularly. 
 Under scenario (a), moral rights may remain peripheral because publishers could 
insist on authors waiving their moral rights.  Publishers might desire this because it will 
enable a greater level of control over the copyright of the works that they own.  The proposed 
system is also designed to generate increased levels of revenue for right holders, and so this 
may be an incentive for publishers to request waiver of an author’s moral rights.  
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 However, under scenario (b), authors might bargain to keep their moral rights. 
Reasons for this may include an attempt to obtain damages for breach of their moral rights, or 
because they wish to restrict certain uses of their works for personal reasons.  
 Since the system proposed in this paper does not necessitate change to the system of 
moral rights, it is expected that there will not be concerns in relation to the protection of 
moral rights at the international level.  Likewise, it is not anticipated that there will be an 
increase in the number of moral rights actions.  However, it should be re-iterated that the 
proposed administrative body needs to closely monitor the situation, in order to ensure that 
the use of moral rights does not result in a detrimental impact on creative re-use. 
 Once the proposed system enters into force, the use of moral rights should be 
monitored by an administrative body.
165
  If the body considers that moral rights are being 
used in a manner that is restricting the re-use of copyright content, then it should be given the 
option of lobbying for a more restrictive system. 
 Instituting a narrower system may introduce problems in relation to international 
obligations,
166
 such as that under the Berne Convention.
167
  Art 6bis requires that moral rights 
be given sufficient protection.  It is possible that this would require some renegotiation of 
Berne, although the U.S. only recently signed up to Art 6bis,
168
 and the U.K. has often had to 
amend its laws to ensure compliance.
169
  Consequently, it is suggested that there is scope for 
discussion as to how the U.K. and U.S. can implement a moral rights system. 
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J.  How to ensure that those who re-use content continue to have their interests considered 
1. Types of re-use. 
 In order to ensure that the proposed system guarantees creative re-uses, as opposed to 
merely laying down a system that should encourage them, it is necessary to outline some 
principles to which the administrators and judges of the system may adhere.   This section 
will outline how this could be done. 
 Once a content recipient has either paid for a copyright work, or paid an appropriate 
royalty, he has the positive right to re-use the copyright work.  However, in addition, those 
content recipients will also have the positive right to access a work protected by DRM 
provided it is necessary for a creative re-use.  It is suggested below
170
 that the courts be 
required to follow certain guidelines. In addition, the proposed administrative body will have 
the power to draw up lists of acts that content recipients can carry out.  Content recipients 
have the positive right to access a copyright work so far as necessary for a creative re-use – 
the list does not affect that positive right.  The lists are primarily designed to provide 
guidance for content re-users.  
2. How far should re-use be permitted?  
 A content recipient should be able to access a work at a number of levels.  At first 
blush, this would appear to mean that a work should contain all the source code that would 
reveal all of its inner workings – something required, for instance, by the Open Source 
software GNU GPL.  The paper is not advocating an approach as wide as that of the GNU 
GPL.  What the paper argues is that a content recipient in certain circumstances should be 
able to access the source code – but only if it is necessary for a creative re-use.   
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 There are many benefits to the proposed system.  The proposed system overcomes 
some of the issues with DRM mechanisms.  It has already been detailed that these 
mechanisms may restrict the ability to reproduce an earlier work, or limit the ability to edit 
existing content.
171
  Such mechanisms furthermore restrict the ability of other software to 
interface or interoperate with them.  It is suggested that a consideration of creative re-use in 
legal reasoning would influence the implementation of such mechanisms, and further their 
use in a manner that would encourage creative re-use.  However, such a broad approach to 
reverse engineering may clash with the EU Software Directive
172
 and also the existing 
reverse engineering law in the United States.
173
  Nonetheless, this paper outlines how right 
holders have benefited from encouraging alterations to their work.
174
  
 Ensuring that a work is as accessible as is necessary for a creative re-use requires, 
therefore, at the least a set of statements or principles that should be followed.  It necessitates 
a consideration of how works are re-used by content recipients.  This is not simply limited to 
whether a content recipient can gain any access to an earlier work, but also the degree of 
access.  
 It is argued that there needs to be explicit consideration, in a statute, of the needs of 
content recipients to re-use a work.  Digital technology provides access to increasing amounts 
of content but can limit the ability of the content recipient to re-use that content.  Digital 
technology therefore changes the nature of the balancing exercise.  The courts need to 
address the re-use of content to ensure that they consider the wider balancing exercise 
between right holders and content recipients.  
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3. How far should access be provided to a work? Court guidelines and public lists. 
 The paper proposes that there should be a system that will require the courts and the 
legislature to consider the stages involved in creative re-use of copyright works.  This will 
require a consideration of reverse engineering, in a manner similar to that used by the Ninth 
Circuit in Sega v. Accolade.
175
  To recall, Judge Reinhardt looked at the stages involved in 
reverse engineering a work: 
Accolade used a two-step process to render its video games 
compatible with the Genesis console. First, it “reverse 
engineered” Sega’s video game programs in order to discover 
the requirements for compatibility with the Genesis console. As 
part of the reverse engineering process, Accolade transformed 
the machine-readable object code contained in commercially 
available copies of Sega’s game cartridges into human-readable 
source code using a process called “disassembly” or 
“decompilation.”176 
 
 If a content recipient wishes to creatively re-use a menu system in a DVD, then they 
should be able to observe how this operates.  This will extend their knowledge, and, 
following the Lockean doctrine of knowledge, thereby encourage them to be more creative.
177
 
It is for this reason that the paper proposes that content recipients who re-use copyright 
content should be provided with the positive right to access copyright content.  Courts will 
have to consider the component elements of that right, namely the stages involved in reverse 
engineering.  
 However, there should be limits to the positive right of the content recipient to be able 
to access copyright content.  If the right is to be given an extremely liberal and broad reading, 
this would require that all works be fully accessible.  The right has already been qualified in 
that it will provide access only ‘as far as necessary for a creative use.’  It is hoped that court 
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judgments will build up a precedent of acts covered by that phrase.  Furthermore, the 
proposed administrative body will have the power to make a list of acts that come within that 
phrase.  Consequently, it will become clearer both to right holders and circumventors what 
sort of creative re-uses are likely to be accepted for the purposes of circumventing DRM.  
 It is submitted that many creative re-uses share common characteristics, such as the 
combination of samples or extracts from films and music.  Remixing of content should 
therefore be permissible.  It is expected that these principles will have to be fleshed out on a 
case by case-by-case basis, thus, and so two case studies are provided below
178
 demonstrating 
how this system could develop.  In doing this, there will develop a list of circumstances will 
develop where re-users can be certain of their rights, and be able to point to clear precedent.  
The list will be drawn up by the administrative body detailed below,
 179
 and will apply to both 
analogue and digital works.  
 This list will allow those who produce circumvention mechanisms to know with 
greater clarity which acts are permitted by the law.  However, if their mechanisms allow acts 
that are not ‘necessary for a creative re-use’, then they may be liable in for an action for 
damages.  The same principle can be applied to file sharing networks.  It must be recalled that 
under the proposed system, content recipients are not to be considered infringers, but that 
recipients will be liable for any royalties owed and possibly additional damages.  This 
substantially limits the scope of an action for secondary infringement, but right holders still 
have the option of taking action, where appropriate, against the end user for royalties. 
 However, should an individual be able to aggressively argue that access to protected 
code is ‘necessary for a creative re-use’, and that not allowing access to do so would be an 
infringement of his positive right to be able to access the work?  What about where highly 
complicated DRM has been used that nobody can circumvent?  In this situation, it is 
                                                 
178
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suggested that the proposed administrative body may make a ruling to allow certain content 
to be accessible.  Such rulings could become preferable to circumvention, but they could 
result in complete loss of control over the content.  A ruling should thus only be a last resort, 
and so a certain period of time will need to elapse before a ruling may be sought.  The 
proposed administrative body will set that period after examination.  Another situation where 
content may be difficult to access could be where a developer does not use DRM, but hides 
code deep inside computer hardware. In such situations, the same rule should apply.  
 
 However, the question remains whether such rulings are extending beyond the 
boundaries of the proposed copyright balancing exercise.  U.S. case law suggests that if a 
contract provides for copyright style reproduction rights, then it should be considered to be 
within the “general subject matter”180 of copyright law.  The result, if that is found, is that 
federal copyright law could overrule state contract law.
181
  A similar rule could be applied to 
the situation where re-use is being inhibited.  If anything is inhibiting creative re-use of a 
copyright work then it will be within the proposed balancing exercise.  Whether that re-use is 
commercial or not will be deemed irrelevant – creative re-use is the central balancing criteria. 
IV. Impact on associated laws. 
 It has already been outlined that if the proposed scheme were to be adopted, right 
holders’ copyrights would be reduced.182  However, there are a number of potential knock-on 
effects on other associated areas of law.  It has been suggested in the previous paragraph that 
the scope of the proposed balancing exercise would be determined by the “general subject 
                                                 
180
 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640 
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matter” test.183  Whenever a creative re-use is inhibited, a re-user of copyright content can 
rely on his positive right to access a work ‘as far as necessary for a creative re-use.’  This 
naturally raises concerns as to conflicts with other laws.  
 One area where there is conflict is in relation to provisions dealing with 
interoperability.  The EU Software Directive,
184
 for instance, provides that, subject to various 
qualifications, interoperability should be possible between computer programs.
185
 This 
provision has been implemented in the U.K. by s.50B CDPA 1988.
186
  The U.S. DMCA also 
provides a provision that outlines there should only be proprogram-to-program 
interoperability when it is applied.
187
  However, the proposed system considerably extends 
beyond this, potentially requiring interoperability not just between computer programs, but 
also between any file so long as it is ‘necessary for a creative re-use.’  A similar issue arises 
in relation to the EUCD, which requires protection of DRM mechanisms.
188
  Similar law 
exists in the U.S. in §1201 of the DMCA.
189
  If the proposed system is to allow access to 
works protected by DRM mechanisms ‘as far as necessary for a creative re-use,’ then this 
will run counter to those laws.  In relation to the U.K., this raises the issue that EU law might 
need to be breached, and consequently various actions may be brought against the U.K.
190
  In 
the U.S, the DMCA needs to be amended, which may be difficult considering bearing in 
mind the lack of success of reforms that have been proposed for it. 
 Patent law may be in issue where a patent is being used to protect a copyright work. 
For instance, a patent may exist over a piece of hardware which contains a copyright work.  
                                                 
183
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The patent may be infringed because an element has been re-used in a competing product.  
By applying the “general subject matter” test, any re-use which inhibits creative re-use of a 
copyright work will be permitted under the proposed balancing exercise.  That does not 
preclude infringement proceedings under patent law.  Nonetheless, it is suggested that the 
proposed administrative body should keep the situation under review.   
 If the proposed system is implemented in the U.S., then there might also be issues in 
relation to the Constitution.  This is because the Constitution emphasizes the current interests 
of authors, as it states that protection is “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”191  Passing an amendment could be difficult, considering that two 
thirds of both Houses of Congress have to vote in favour of amendment, or alternatively two 
thirds of states have to call a Constitutional Convention.
192
 
 In addition, provision of positive rights to content recipients allowing them to re-use 
copyright works could be problematic in terms of compliance with the Berne Convention
193
 
and TRIPS.
194
  The paper proposes restricting right holders’ abilities to bring an action for 
infringement of, notably, the reproduction right, the adaptation right (in the U.K.) and the 
derivative right (in the U.S.).  The Berne Convention states that member states will protect 
these rights.
195
  However, in relation to the reproduction right, article 9(2) states, “[i]t shall be 
a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works 
in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal 
                                                 
191
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exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
author.”196  
 Can the level of reproduction allowed by the proposed system be called a “special 
case?”  Initially it would seem not, but Senftleben argues that such “special cases” have been 
added for specific policy reasons.
197
  It is possible, therefore, to argue that any state seeking 
to implement the proposed system should seek to have a “special case” amendment made to 
its legislation.  However, it might be stretching the phrase “special cases” to turn it into the 
main rule.  An alternative line of argument could be that the proposed system does provide 
for remuneration of right holders, and that they can take legal action if they are not 
remunerated for certain uses of their works.
198
  Nonetheless, could the proposed system be 
construed as not being consistent with the “normal exploitation of a work?” 
 The three step test found in Article 13 of TRIPS states that, “[m]embers shall confine 
limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the rights holder.”199  The proposed system does provide right holders with the 
rights to obtain financial reward for the re-use of their work.  This is important, because a 
WTO Panel in relation to the “normal exploitation of the work” part of the test, “considered 
that a conflict arises when the exception or limitation enters into economic competition with 
the ways that right holders normally extract economic value from that right to the work 
(i.e. the copyright) and thereby deprives them of significant or tangible commercial gain.”200  
It is arguable that under the proposed system, normal exploitation of the work will be through 
a combination of requiring purchase of the original work by content recipients, and the 
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payment of royalties.  However, there could be an issue with the positive rights given to the 
recipients of content, in that is not likely to be characterised by a WTO Panel as an exception 
to the rights given to the copyright holder.  This is especially apparent, bearing in mind the 
above WTO Panel decision.  In relation to the third part of the test, the panel stated that 
“there is unreasonable prejudice where an exception or limitation causes or has the potential 
to cause an unreasonable loss of income to the copyright holder.”201  In particular, the Panel 
stated that there will be a breach, if uses, that in principle are “covered by that [copy]right but 
exempted under the exception or limitation, enter into economic competition with the ways 
that right holders normally extract economic value from that right to the work.”202  The Panel 
noted that they would look at the potential impact on economic competition.
203
  Furthermore, 
the Panel referred with support to a suggestion made at the 1967 revision conference in 
Stockholm that “all forms of exploiting a work, which have, or are likely to acquire, 
considerable economic or practical importance, must be reserved to the authors.”204  This 
appears to be a likely conflict with the positive rights given to content recipients, as but under 
the proposed system, the normal way for right holders to gain economic reward would be 
through either purchase of their the authors’ copyright works, or through provision of 
royalties.  Although there will be no royalties if the re-use of a work that is not quantitatively 
substantially similar is not for commercial gain, it could be suggested that such re-uses are 
not in economic competition with the right holder.
205
  
 In summary, to follow the proposed system could result in an adverse finding by a 
WTO Panel.  However, there are counter arguments that the system does provide economic 
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reward for authors, and consequently that their economic interests are not endangered by the 
proposed positive rights for content recipients.  
 
1. Case Studies. 
 Two case studies reveal the inadequate approach of current courts to creative re-use, 
and demonstrate how a reformed approach could be beneficial.  First of all, one may consider 
a student who wishes to capture the interactive element of a DVD, such as the menu 
structure.  In Corley,
206
 Judge Newman argued that a DVD could be copied by camcorder for 
Fair Use purposes, because Fair Use “has never been held to be a guarantee of access to 
copyrighted material in order to copy it by the fair user's preferred technique or in the format 
of the original.”207  However, this might not be able to capture all the elements of the menu, 
such as its interactivity or underlying code.  If the student is unable to invoke his or her 
positive right to access the content, the student can then go either to the proposed 
administrative body or a court.  Under the proposed system, they would be required to look at 
the wider interests of the creative re-user.  In so doing, a court could adopt an approach 
similar to that used by Judge Reinhardt in Sega v Accolade.
208
  He looked at the manner in 
which Accolade had re-used the content for the purpose of reverse engineering.  In this case 
study, what this would mean would is that the court would consider how a user would also be 
able to capture the interactive elements of a DVD.  A court may or may not conclude that 
circumvention of the DRM mechanism is necessary, but it would result in a greater level of 
legal certainty.  There would also be more clarity as to how a DVD interface should be 
reproduced for the purposes of creative re-use.  
                                                 
206
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 For the second case study, we can consider a content recipient who wishes to alter the 
operation of a computer game protected by a DRM mechanism.  In order to change the 
physics engine in the game, to make the game appear more realistic, it might be necessary to 
download an unencrypted version of the executable file.  However, this could be a breach of 
the CDPA,
209
 EUCD
210
 or DMCA,
211
 because it will require circumvention of an access 
mechanism.  To distribute the altered unencrypted file could also be a breach of the 
reproduction and distribution rights. 
 Under the proposed system, the work would be a quantitatively substantially similar 
work, if it reproduces 60% or greater of the earlier work.  If it did, it would then require 
purchase of the earlier work, and it has to be considered whether the re-use is impeded by the 
DRM mechanism.  If the re-use is impeded, then the administrative or judicial body 
concerned will need to grant permission to allow circumvention ‘as far as necessary for a 
creative use.’212  This permission could also be granted if reproduction of less than 60% of 
the original is attempted.  This can then form part of a list that indicates to right holders and 
content recipients the sorts of re-uses that are permissible.  
 The proposed system would state establish that content should be as fully accessible 
as necessary for the purposes of creative re-use.  It will be laid down in statute that courts or 
administrative bodies would have to consider the impact of their decisions upon creative re-
use.  It would not be sufficient, as in Reimerdes, for a judge to state that “[the DMCA] is a 
tool to protect copyright in the digital age”213 and not look at the impact on re-use. 
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V. Structural Change. 
 The proposed reforms suggest that emphasis upon re-use may be achieved by statute 
requiring: 
 That content recipients have the positive right to re-use copyright works. 
 That right holders should be compensated for re-use. 
 That content recipients should have the positive right to access a work so far as 
necessary for creative re-uses. 
 
The paper has argued that it has been the legislative history of the copyright statutes that has 
resulted in insufficient focus upon creative re-use.  This has in large part been due to the lack 
of involvement of representatives of the casual re-user of copyright content in the legislative 
drafting process.  It is suggested that, as content recipients will have the positive right to re-
use copyright works, there is a need for a legal body to be able to enforce their rights.  
 As a group, re-users of copyright content are in many respects, a disparate group. 
Cohen reminds us that “the category of ‘users’ is highly heterogeneous, and by the fact that 
individual users themselves will often have conflicting interests.”214  Furthermore, as a group 
they have no particular representative body.  Any bodies that do represent them do so not as 
copyright users, but in some other capacity.  For instance, in relation to the Library of 
Congress exemptions made under the DMCA, the interests have again been for specific 
groups – such as the visually impaired or computer programmers.215  Alternatively, copyright 
collecting societies do not represent the interests of content recipients, but the interests of 
those content recipients who are able to disseminate works under the current copyright 
regime.  In the U.K., the ‘Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society’ represents authors,216 
but not those who may wish to creatively re-use a book in a way which would result in 
                                                 
214
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copyright infringement.  Voluntary co-regulation, put forward as a proposed method of 
regulating p2p copyright infringements in the U.K.,
217
 is not therefore an option.  
 There is a need for a specific body to represent the broad interests of the re-users of 
copyright works.  To do so would safeguard against any technological developments 
changing the assumed balance of copyright law as has occurred with the development of 
digital technology.  It is suggested that in the U.K., a Tribunal could fulfil this role, and in the 
U.S., a body similar to the Copyright Royalty Board.  As to who should comprise the 
proposed administrative body, it will be necessary to consider the various mechanisms  
through which specific re-users of content may seek specific redress under the current legal 
systems. 
 Prominent among the approaches used at the moment are those relating to exceptions 
from the DRM provisions that result from the WIPO Copyright Treaty.  As mentioned earlier 
in this section, the U.S. has the Library of Congress rule-making procedure that can 
recommend certain exemptions from the DMCA provisions.
218
  The Library of Congress 
method can be criticised as not having any particular body representing content recipients. 
The U.K. has s.296ZE
219
 implementing Article 6(4) of the EUCD,
220
 which allows the 
Secretary of State to make a determination when private parties have been unable to come to 
an agreement that allows the fulfilment of an implemented exemption in the EUCD.  This 
approach is subject to the same criticism.  
 Other countries’ attempts at dealing with implementing the anti-circumvention 
provision of the EUCD have been similarly limited.  In Ireland, there is a procedure where 
                                                 
217
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beneficiaries of the exemptions can apply directly to the Irish High Court.  In the Irish 
Copyright and Related Rights Information Act, s.374(3) states: 
 [i]n the event of a dispute arising, the beneficiary may apply to 
the High Court for an order requiring a person to do or to 
refrain from doing anything the doing or refraining from of 
doing of which is necessary to ensure compliance by that 
person with the provisions of this section.
221
   
 
Germany and Luxembourg have similar provisions enabling them to seek injunctive relief. 
An alternative approach is followed in Greece, Lithuania, and Slovenia, whereby mediation is 
encouraged.
222
  However, there is no specific representation of those re-using content as a 
group.  
 The closest that a system specifically aimed at representing those who re-use content 
is in France, with the implementation of the EUCD in the Droit d'auteur et droits voisins 
dans la société de l'information.  Article L.331-5 states that DRMs “must not have the effect 
of preventing interoperability.”  The Act also introduces a committee to enforce this – the 
Regulatory Authority for Technical Measures – the Autorite de Regulation des Mesures 
Techniques (ARMT).  Interestingly, during the legislative history of the act several methods 
of regulation were suggested.  The use of the civil courts was proposed (as in Ireland) but this 
was disliked due to the risk of lack of knowledge by the courts and the possibility that 
sensitive DRM information could be leaked; likewise the use of the Council on Competition 
was not accepted, due to the Council agreeing with what the lawmakers considered to be 
restrictive use of DRM by Apple in i-Tunes.  
 The ARMT has three main goals, the third of which is especially relevant to 
encourage re-use of copyright content: 
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 Ensure that DRMs “because of a lack of interoperability, do not create, in the 
use of a work, additional and independent limitations to those expressly chosen by the 
rightholder” (Art L.331-6) 
 
 Monitor technological protection methods and identification methods for 
copyright works (Art L.331-17) 
 
 Ensure that DRM does not prevent users benefiting from the copyright 
exemptions (L.331-8) 
 
 A number of independent individuals comprise the ARMT,
223
 and impartiality is 
attempted by also stating in Art L.331-19 that those who were or are involved with Collecting 
Societies, or the production or distribution of music and films, are not to be allowed to be 
members of the ARMT.  However, the system becomes of less use to re-users of copyright 
content because the only bodies who may refer a case to the ARMT are “software publishers, 
manufacturers of technical systems and service providers.”224  
 There is therefore no clear precedent as to how the reforms proposed by the paper 
could be administered and monitored by an external body.  The paper will now consider how 
this could be achieved in the U.K. and the U.S. 
A. The U.K. 
 In the U.K., could a body such as the U.K.'s Copyright Tribunal be able to administer 
and monitor the proposed system?  The Copyright Tribunal is currently responsible for 
administering and monitoring licensing bodies,
225
 and has powers to vary or approve 
schemes, hold that applicants should be granted a licence, or vary approved licence terms. 
The Tribunal decides cases upon the basis of “reasonableness” – in doing so, it may look to 
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the availability of the work, the proportion copied, and the use to which the works will be put. 
It should also look to whether there would appear to be “discrimination” between the scheme 
in dispute and other schemes.  However, there have been issues raised as to the effectiveness 
of the body – namely for being costly and lengthy in its deliberations.226  
 Whilst it is a body that claims to be impartial,
227
 membership of the body comprises 
of:   
... a Chairman and two deputy Chairmen who are appointed by 
the Lord Chancellor after consultation with the Scottish 
Minister, and not less than two, but no more than eight ordinary 
members appointed by the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry. The Tribunal operates on a panel basis and its 
members have wide expertise in business, public 
administration, and the professions.
228
 
 
The Copyright Tribunal does not therefore resolve the issue as to the representation of the 
recipients of content.  In an attempt to remedy this, a House of Commons Committee has 
suggested that users should be able to have easier access to the Tribunal.
229
  However, this 
does not deal with the broader question of how to ensure that creative re-use is considered by 
the Tribunal.  
B. The US. 
 In the U.S., the Copyright Royalty Board “determines rate and terms of the copyright 
statutory licenses and makes determinations on distribution of statutory license royalties 
                                                 
226
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collected by the Copyright Office.”230  The Board has six copyright royalty judges, who are 
full time employees of the library.  That system is potentially open to the same criticism as 
the U.K. Copyright Tribunal, as again they do not necessarily represent the wider interests of 
the re-users of copyright content.  
C. Proposed reforms to the existing bodies. 
 Notwithstanding these shortcomings, it is suggested that the proposed system would 
need to be administered by reformed versions of, in the U.K., the Copyright Tribunal and in 
the U.S., the Copyright Royalty Board.  However, the reformed body should have individuals 
who are appointed to explicitly consider the interests of creative re-users.  Membership may 
consist of authors, publishers and creative re-users in a tripartite structure.  Whilst proposing 
a body that could regulate the use of DRM in the U.K., the U.K.’s All Party Internet Group in 
2006 stated in a report: 
We ... see an important role for an independent ‘stakeholders’ 
body with representatives from rights holders, the creators of 
content, the libraries and also consumers’ in fact, just the types 
of people who have taken the time and trouble to advise us in 
this inquiry. This body should be specifically attempting to 
ensure that domestic legislation, and pan-European legislation 
developed in Brussels, strikes an appropriate balance between 
competing interests.
231
 
 
In the U.K. chairing of the group, and appointment of members, would be done under the 
discretion of the Secretary of State or through a representative of the British Library because 
of their “middle-ground position between consumers on the one hand and the rights holders 
on the other.”232  In the U.S., the judges of the Copyright Royalty Board could take this role. 
The appointment of representatives of creative re-users could be more problematic.  It is 
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suggested that what could occur is the appointment of authors who have been on record as 
having previously obtained a licence from right holders.  Such information could be obtained 
from clearing houses.  In any event, the body would have to be bound by rules that emphasise 
the need to consider creative re-use.  These rules would mirror those put forward in Sega v 
Accolade,
233
 the principles of knowledge and re-use such as those argued for by Locke,
234
 and 
those discussed by Lord Camden in Donaldson v Beckett.
235
  They would be matched to a 
system of royalties that would be set by the administrative body. 
 In terms of legal function, the reformed body would operate similarly to the U.K.’s 
Copyright Tribunal or the U.S. Copyright Royalty Board, in that it could make decisions that 
can be appealed to the domestic courts.  It is suggested that the administrative body would set 
the royalty rates.  Although this removes the ability of right holders to effectively bargain 
their own rates, this does mean that exorbitant rates are avoided.
236
  In any event, works that 
are popular will sell more and therefore obtain more royalty than less popular works.  
  
D.  How the proposed administrative body would operate. 
 The manner in which works would have their royalties set would be as open as 
possible.  As the proposed system concerns re-use which results in financial profit, and is 
based upon quantitative re-use, it would be possible to provide guidelines as to the percentage 
of fees likely to result.  For instance, the re-use of a specific piece of film could be placed on 
a sliding scale, so that reduced re-use would attract a smaller percentage fee, and a larger re-
use a higher percentage fee.  These could be set out in a table.  
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 It has to be remembered that these royalties would only be payable by those who seek 
to make financial profit from the work.  For such re-users, the fees would be easy to predict. 
With the rise of DRM and CMI, it is possible that the use of DOIs (Digital Object Identifiers 
– this is identifying CMI) could be used as a way of creating an automatic e-payment system.   
 As regards enforcement, the proposed system will be enforced in the same way as the 
current system.  In other words, it will be the responsibility of existing right holders to begin 
an action to obtain royalties if they are not being paid. Right holders may use existing 
methods to obtain the details of those using p2p services to distribute copyright works 
without permission.  It has to be recalled that the proposed reforms would not require 
royalties from content recipients who have not altered content for financial gain.  Actions 
against p2p users would only be against those who have downloaded content identical with, 
or quantitatively substantially similar to, the original work when that original work has not 
been purchased.  This should encourage creative re-uses.  Such a self-enforcing system also 
keeps running costs down; enforcing a system of licensing could be extremely expensive.
237
 
In the U.K., one of BERR’s238 alternative systems in its consultation paper was for a “third 
party” to regulate p2p file sharing, but they suggested that it could also be slow, as well as 
having “e-privacy issues and data protection issues.”239 
 In terms of providing funding for running such a system, there are a number of 
possible revenue streams.  As William Fisher notes in relation to his proposed system, it 
would be desirable to fund an administrative agency through direct taxation.
240
  That would 
be the preferred approach here.  As the system is designed to operate as effectively as 
possible without intervention, most of the running costs would involve setting royalty rates 
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and administering disputes.  The current U.K. Copyright Tribunal, and the U.S. Copyright 
Royalty Board, both do this.  Ensuring that these bodies can cope with an increased workload 
does not need to be expensive.  For instance, the Copyright Tribunal, in its current guise, has 
only marginal running costs.
241
  However, as a recent report noted, funding for the Tribunal is 
nonetheless in need of improvement.
242
  The proposed U.K. and U.S. bodies are not a 
considerable step beyond the current bodies, so additional funding would mainly be in 
dealing with the possibility of a greater case load when determining disputes.  Such 
additional funding could comprise of a marginal tax on royalties provided through the 
system. 
 
VI. Concluding comments. 
 The proposed system would provide considerably greater certainty for the re-users of 
copyright content.  The system would also provide additional exposure to existing copyright 
content, and the requirement of purchasing of the original, along with the compulsory 
licensing system, could increase revenue to existing right holders.  The proposals specifically 
are: 
 That content recipients should be given the positive right to re-use copyright   
works. 
 That right holders should be compensated for re-use. 
 That content recipients should have the positive right to access a work so far as 
necessary for creative re-uses.  
 
Compensation of right holders is to be achieved by: 
 
 Requiring the purchase of the original work that is re-used, if the re-use is 
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quantitatively substantially similar to that work.
243
 
 Where a work is not quantitatively substantially similar, the institution of a 
compulsory licensing scheme based upon quantitative similarity. This will 
apply where there is, or has been, ‘financial gain’ for the re-user of the original 
work.
244
 
 
 In so doing, the copyright system will be taking into account the interests of creative 
re-users of copyright content.  The rise of digital technology has provided more opportunities 
for content recipients to re-use content, but the copyright balancing exercise has continued to 
focus on creativity being equivalent to protecting the existing interests of right holders.  It is 
suggested that the proposed reforms will remedy this shortcoming in the current copyright 
balance.  
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